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VIETNAM AND THE PRESS 
MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI 
The Vietnam War was and is a potent political symbol, a montage of dis-
crete, contradictory, and arresting images seared into our individual and col-
lective psyches: a Buddhist monk in flames, a South Vietnamese officer 
coolly blowing the brains out of a captured Vietcong, an American flag 
being burned. While for many Vietnam is remembered through direct, per-
sonal experiences, for most people the war was and is known only through 
experiences ITlcdiated by others. As the primary mediator of images of the 
war, the press holds unparalleled power-the power to decide what the war 
means.! 
Questions about the role of the news media during the Vietnam era are as 
common as questions about the war itself. Was the press simply the chron-
icler. the unbiased eyes and ears of a nation, or did it systematically distort 
reality? Did the press reflect the changing national mood about the war or 
did it cause the shift? Did the press act as national conscience or national trai-
tor? Was the press an independent voice or a mouthpiece for the White 
House, radical students, or Hanoi? 
This essay presents arguments and evidence which directly address these 
questions. Overarching these particular concerns, however, is the more en-
compassing theme of how the Vietnam experience included both an exten-
sion of past press-government relations and an important turning point in 
that relationship. By understanding the role of the news media in our Viet-
nam involvement, we can reach a deeper understanding of what the role of 
the press is in America, and of what it should be. 
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The Press in America 
The Conflicting Roles of the Press What is unique about press coverage of 
Vietnam is not that it broke with prior traditions of press-government rela-
tions, but that because of the length and the nature of the war, it fit so many 
different traditions. The Vietnam experience points out the inherent contra-
~ictions that always plague the American press. Understanding these contra-
dictions is the first step in understanding the role of the press during the 
Vietnam War. 
Did the press accurately portray the war, or was coverage biased? One 
must first ask what accurate and biased mean. Each soldier's experience was 
different in, Vietnam. The war varied by region, season, and year. 2 The war 
was different depending upon whether it was viewed from Washington or 
Berkeley, Hanoi or Saigon, Quang Tri or Dong Hoi. The war was different 
depending upon whether it was viewed through the eyes of an American or 
a Vietnamese, a private or a general, a student or a soldier, a peasant or a 
businessperson. Even given unlimited resources, information, print space, 
and airtime, the press could not present the Vietnam experience "accu-
rately." It was impossible. Rather than ask if the Vietnam experience was 
covered accurately, we must ask the more modest question, were there fac-
tual errors? Instead of asking was the coverage biased, we must ask, from 
whose perspective(s) was the coverage biased, for what reasons, and to what 
end? , 
Most of the debate over coverage of Vietnam concerns issues of inter-
pretation rather than fact, errors of omission rather than commission. The 
exception to this involves counting-how many Vietcong and North Viet-
namese soldiers there were and how many of them were killed. It is clear that 
the United States military, intentionally or not, systematically underreported 
the strength of the opposition and overreported the number of "kills." It is 
also clear that the press corps, with few exceptions, accepted these official 
numbers and reported them dutifully to the American public until the Tet 
offensive. 
The reporting of enemy strength and body counts points to important 
continuities with past press-government interactions. First among them is 
the dependency of the press on the very institutions it covers. This is particu-
larly true for government, whose access to and control of information is su-
perior to that of the press. It is also especially true in foreign affairs coverage 
(since due in part to cultural and language barriers, alternate sources are lack-
ing), and during a war (since control of information is even more tightly 
maintained). Deadlines add to this dependency, since reporters and editors 
must depend on the more accessible, official stories and have less time to 
question them or check out alternate sources. Naturally, such deadline pres-
sures are more intense in foreign affairs coverage. 
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Secondly, the press is restrained by its own loyalty. Reporters, editors, 
and producers are citizens, often even patriots. Their tendency when rc-
porting on international affairs, especially during wartime, is to a,!oid 
sabotaging the national interest, even to aid that interest through the con-
tent and style of coverage. Hence, all other things being equal, the in-
clination is to report what the government wants reported. 
A ,third factor shaping media coverage is economic interest. Even if 
journalists, editors, and producers arc not superpatriots, they know that 
appearing unpatriotic does not play well with many readers, viewers, and 
sponsors. Fear of alienating the public and sponsors, especially in war-
time, serves as a real, often unstated tether, keeping the press tied to ac-
cepted wisdom, 
Why, then, is the press often blamed by politicians, academics, even 
journalists, for undermining the war effort, for turning the public against 
the war in Vietnam, and for distorting our image of the war? The answer 
to these questions lies in a set of traditions that conflict with those just 
discussed, While the press has a tradition of national loyalty, it has a com-
peting role as "watchdog" of government. While the press is constrained 
by economic interests, it is also motivated by a desire to inform the pub-
lic as best it can. And finally, while the media traditionally stays close to 
the mainstream, it also thrives on the sensational, the dramatic, the con-
troversial. The mixed message sent out by the press concerning Vietnam 
resulted from the interplay of these competing pressures. At different 
times different traditions dominated. At any given time, conflicts over 
how to cover the war arc evident~between mediums, among reporters, 
and-because of journalists', editors', producers', and owners' different 
perspectives~even within single stories, 
The Press and Boundary Jl.ifaintenance: Defining Consensus, Controversy, and 
Deviance The pushes and pulls of the press's competing tendencies arc 
bounded, however. When the topic is consensual, the media serves as ad-
vocate or celebrant of that consensus.-> When the topic is one about which 
legitimate groups or individuals disagree, then the media is obliged to 
present those opposing views. The key, however, is the term legitimate. 
The media does not advocate or even neutrally present views that fall 
outside of the dominant culture, While the lines between consensus, le-
gitimate controversy, and deviance are not written in stone, they are rcal, 
and the rules governing media coverage are different for each. 
Consider, for example, national election coverage. The importance of 
elections in the political process is never debated. Elections as an institu-
tion faU clearly within the sphere of consensus. During the election cam-
paign, however, the media are free to present the opposing views of le-
gitimate political candidates~almost always defined as the Democratic 
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and the Republican nominees. This is the sphere of legitimate contro-
versy. The views of individuals and groups falling beyond its bounds-
those of fascists, communists, socialists, etc.-are seldom covered in the 
mainstream press. When they are, it is usually to expose them as threats 
to the consensus, not to present their points of view objectively. (FCC 
guidelines for the Fairness Doctrine state, "It is not the Commission's in-
tention to make time available to Communists or to the Communist 
viewpoints.") Since the press is the donlinant source from which people 
learn about the political world, it is not only part of the spheres of con-
sensus and legitimate controversy, l;nit also "plays the role of exposing, 
condemning, or excluding from th~ public agenda those who violate or 
challenge the political consensus. It marks out and defends the limits of 
acceptable political conflict. "4 
Coverage of Vietnam, despite claims to the contrary, seldom left the 
spheres of consensus and legitimate controversy. When it did, it was to 
ridicule deviance rather than present it as a legitimate alternative. The 
media did, of course, criticize the war, and helped shape the debate over 
the war's direction. And Vietnam was covered differently than other 
wars. But the mainstream press never stood outside the dominant culture 
to criticize it. Instead, it reflected societal shifts in the boundaries between 
consensus, legitimate controversy, and deviance. Ultimately it continued 
to serve as a boundary-maintaining mechanism, preserving the status 
quo from serious challenges. 
The Press, War, afId Censorship War both intensifies and changes the 
norms of press-government relations. Prior to World War I, reporters ei-
ther found their own way into a war zone, or, at the discretion of the 
commander, attached themselves to a military unit. If found in a war 
zone without permission, they were often arrested. The unprecedented 
scale of World War I, the press's increased ability to gather and translnit 
information, and the growing unhappiness of everyone with the resu1ting 
chaos in press coverage led to a more formal system in which the press 
was granted routine access to the front in exchange for formal accredida-
tion and censorship by the military. The threat oflosing accredidation or 
being jailed, their knowledge that copy and film would be censored any-
way, and their underlying patriotism meant that journalists often en-
gaged in self-censorship. As Frederick Palmer of the New York Herald 
wrote, "We rarely had our copy cut. We had learned too well where the 
line was drawn on military secrecy. The important items were those we 
left out; and these made us public liars." 5 
This system of accredidation, access, and censorship, which remained 
largely in place through the Korean War, was as important politically as it 
was militarily. The mobilization of public support for a war is as critical 
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as the mobilization of troops. From the government's perspective, the 
press needed enough freedom to report back frequently to the public, but 
enough control to assure that what was reported boosted rather than hurt 
morale. Often more than military secrets were the subject of censorship. 
During the Korean conflict, for example, the press was forbidden to 
make any derogatory comments about United Nations troops. 
VJ:hile the accrediting of journalists continued in Vietnam, formal cen-
sorship did not. The military believed it gained morc by limiting the ac-
cess of journalists than by giving them complete access in exchange for 
censorship. In addition, since the United States' involvement in Vietnam 
fell short of declared war, full censorship and its enforcement were politi-
cally and legally difficult. Finally, it was assumed that the combination of 
the threat of loss of accreditation, journalistic patriotism, the tradition of 
"neutrality and objectivity," and the dependence of the press on official 
sources of information would make voluntary guidelines workable in 
place of prior censorship. This assumption proved correct for most of 
this very long war. Eventually, however, uncensored coverage, the lim-
ited nature of the war, and a growing, vocal, legitimate opposition in the 
States, combined to shift the boundaries of legitimate controversy, and 
ultimately, of the consensus itself. 
Covering the War in Vietnam 
No News Is Good News: Coverage of Vietnam Prior to 1964 Prior to 1964 
the only extensive coverage of Vietnam came during the 1963 Buddhist 
crises. (, Networks did not assign full-time film crews and reporters until 
the middle of 1963, and only the New York Times had a full-time corre-
spondent in Saigon during the Kennedy administration. It was in this pe-
riod, however, that the context for future coverage of the war was set. 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, debating the wisdom of the Cold 
War was taboo. For most people this acquiesence was less because they 
feared retaliation than because, immersed in this ideological consensus, 
they never thought to question it. In addition, during the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations, a bipartisan consensus on national security 
removed most foreign policy decision making from the public agenda. 
Thus, neither the fact nor the method of American involvement in Viet-
nam was deemed newsworthy. 
When, beginning in 1961, Vietnam occasionally made the news, the 
cold war consensus and the media's dependence on government sources 
combined to assure coverage supportive of U.S. policy. Consider the fol-
lowing quotes from the New York Times: "General Taylor heads a twelve-
man group . . . assessing how Washington can best stop the Red ad-
vance" (1961); and, "Communist guerillas trying to subvert this country 
admit to having underestimated the depth of the United States inten-
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tions" (1963). Such ideological content, typical of reporting prior to 
1964, was not viewed as violating the norm of objective reporting pre-
cisely because it fell within the cold war consensus. According to one 
NBC correspondent, "To the degree that we in the media paid any atten-
tion at all to that small, dirty war in those years, we almost wholly re-
ported the position of the government. "7 
A typical case of government news management occurred in late 1961. 
General Taylor, the president's military advisor, had concluded that South 
Vietnalll could not survive the Vietcong and North Vietnamese "insur-
gency" without the help of more than the 685 American advisors permit-
ted by the 1954 Geneva agreement. While Kennedy reluctantly accepted 
Taylor's recommendation (by the time of his death nearly 17 ,000 Ameri-
can troops were stationed in Vietnam), he did not want public attention 
drawn to the escalation. The White House leaked misleading information 
suggesting that both Taylor and Kennedy opposed sending troops to 
Vietnam. This was the story reported in the press. The New York Tim'es, 
for example, printed that "officials said it was correct to infer from this 
that General Taylor did not look favorably on the sending of United 
States combat troops at this time" and "the president and General Taylor 
agreed, according to reliable information available here, that the South 
Vietnamese government is capable of turning back the COffitllunist 
threat." The story spent one day on the front page. 
So the door was opened to U.S. troops fighting and dying in Vietnam 
while the press reported that it was still closed and locked. In December 
1961, when the first U.S. troops authorized to provide "direct military 
support" to the South Vietnamese sailed up the Saigon River, the New 
York Times carried the story on the twenty flIst page. And at a televised 
press conference in January 1962, in answer to the direct question, "Mr. 
President, arc American troops now in combat in Vietnam?" Kennedy 
simply said no and went on to the next question. He was not chal-
lenged-although the fust U. S. combat death in Vietnam had occurred 
three weeks earlier. 
Despite the predominantly cold war coverage between 1961 and 1964, 
some reporters did raise questions about America's Vietnam policy. As 
the number of combat deaths increased (from 1 in 1961 to 787 in 1963), 
the press found it difficult to ignore the conflict. And as the disparity be-
tween officially reported and real u.S. policy widened (for example, in 
December of 1961, with at least 2000 Americans in combat zones autho-
rized to carry and Eue weapons, the official count was still 685 advisors), 
the number of sources who questioned the honesty of govcrnm_ent state-
ments also increased. 
While this did not mean that press coverage was consistently negative, 
it did result in "mixed signals." For example, in late 1961 a New York 
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Times editorial stated, "Fresh details arc slowly emerging from reticent 
Administration sources about the expanded program of American partic-
ipation in South Vietnam's anti-communist struggle." This sentence cap-
tures the complex relationship of the press to government, and the am-
bivalence of the press about that relationship. Its acceptance of the basic 
correctness o£V.S. goals is evidenced in the phrase "American participa-
tion ,in South Vietnam's anti-communist struggle." But journalists' sus-
picion that there was more to U.S. involvement than met the eye, and 
their annoyance at government unwillingness to provide more informa-
tion about that involvement shows, too, in the phrases "slowly emerg-
ing," and "reticent Administration sources." 
This example also reveals the press's almost total dependence on the 
government for information; frustrated or not, the media can only report 
as much as those "reticent administration officials" will say. As U.S. in-
volvement in Vietnam increased so, too, did the potential for official and 
credible sources who would provide alternative information or inter-
pretations. Prior to 1964, however, such voices were rare and usually 
easily silenced. In February 1961, for example, thc Republican National 
Committee asked the president to make "a full report to the American 
people" concerning U. S. involvement in Vietnam. While affirming their 
commitment to ""any policy which will block the Communist conquest 
of Southeast Asia," the Republicans raised concerns that the u.S. was 
"moving toward another Korea which might embroil the entire Far East." 
This was one of the earliest attempts to redefine the boundary between 
consensus and legitimate controversy. Stopping the communist threat in 
Southeast Asia is reasserted as a consensus issue, but the Kennedy admin-
istration's strategy for doing so is gently pushed toward the sphere of le-
gitimate controversy. The challenge was not made by the press, but by 
players who are considered legitimate actors within the hegemonic cul-
ture. In fact, while reporting the Republican challenge, the New York 
Times supported Kennedy in an editorial, arguing in true boundary-
maintaining fashion, that "undue publicity ... could compromise Wash-
ington's effort." Even this minor challenge quickly faded, as the Republi-
cans conceded to Kennedy's call for a continuation of the "very strong 
bipartisan consensus" in foreign policy. A Democratic challenge in 1963 
followed a similar pattern. A true shifting of boundaries would not occur 
until the Tet offensive. 
Challenges most often finding their way into the press during this pe-
riod originated with U.S. troops and middle-level officers. In managing 
the news, the government relied on its ability to control information, on 
the press's commitment to "objective" reporting, and on its loyalty to the 
u.S. cause rather than on censorship. As a result, the opinions of soldiers 
and offIcers in the field could be and were communicated directly to the 
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public. In a traditional, declared war this would not be a problem. Viet-
nam, however, was a "limited" war; Americans, though shooting and 
being shot at, though killing and being killed, were not soldiers, but "ad-
visors." Victory in battle and in the "pacification program" depended 
not only on how U.S. soldiers performed, but on how South Vietnamese 
soldiers and, ultimately, the South Vietnamese government performed. 
Mo'reever, just who the enemy was was unclear-was it North Vietnam? 
The Vietcong? The Soviet Union? Communism? The resulting frustra-
tions and uncertainties were managed within the adlninistration, and 
even, with a few exceptions, within the U. S. government and military 
more generally. But in the field this was more difficult. Again, most cover-
age was neither negative nor pessimistic. Even David Halberstam, the 
New York Times' columnist whom Kennedy wanted removed from Saigon 
because of his negative coverage of the war, supported the war effort, 
often writing in the loyal tradition of World War II correspondents: 
Here a handful of tough United States Special Forces men day after day live a 
precarious existence training several hundred Montagnards, or mountain 
tribesmen ... The Americans ... seem completely indifferent to danger ... 
"We've got a job to do and we do it." According to Lieut. Pete Skamser of 
Covina, CA., ... every man on the team is willing to die for Dak Pek. (1962) 
Mixed in with upbeat reports, however, were signs of doubt and of 
what Hallin calls" cautious pessimism." These were not the inventions of 
unpatriotic journalists; they reflected the frustrations of advisors who 
were committed to the objectives of the war but disillusioned by the tac-
tics. The press gave voice to frustration over the limited nature of the 
war, its civil/guerrilla war character, the incompetence of the South Viet-
namese army, and the corruptness of the Diem regime. The result was 
reporting like the following New York Tirues excerpts: 
United States Army helicopters carried a Vietnamese battalion in a successful 
raid today ... Hut as usual the main enemy force got away ... The Govern-
ment troops failed to exploit the Viet Cong state of shock. They bunched up 
... under the shade of coconut trees until an American advisor cried out in 
exasperation, "Let's move the thing forward." (March 9,1962) 
The Battle of Ap Hac, in which attacking South Vietnamese troops were badly 
beaten by Communist guerillas, has bewildered high United States officials in 
Saigon. United States advisors in the field, however, have long felt that condi-
tions here made a defeat like this virtually inevitable ... American officers .. 
feel that what happened at Ap Hac goes deeper than one battle and is directly 
tied to the question~whether the Vietnamese are really interested in having 
American advisors and listening to them. (January 7, 1963) 
In reporting the soldier's perspective of the war, the media never ques-
tioned our right or our motives for being in Vietnam. Nor did they ques-
tion the motives or bravery of U.s. soldiers. To the contrary, the press 
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often championed their cause, as when in 1962 the New York Times criti-
cized the government for not awarding the Purple Heart to soldiers 
wounded in Vietnam. Like the soldiers it reported on, the press believed 
in the cause; when critical, it reflected concern that bad policies put that 
cause at risk. 
Entering the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy: The Buddhist Crisis of 1963 
and the Fall of Diem The most intensive coverage of Vietnam prior to 
1964 was during the Buddhist crisis. Diem garnered much of his support 
from Vietnam's Catholic population. On May 8, 1963, Buddhists in Hue 
were prohibited from flying religious flags during the celebration of Bud-
dha's birthday. Protests began immediately, leading to six months of dra-
matic, violent confrontations between Buddhists and the South Viet-
namese government. Negative press roverage during thls period is often 
used as evidence of media policymaking power, since prior to the crisis 
the administration supported Diem, and by its end actively supported a 
coup against him. More pointedly, the press is accused of undermining 
the U. S. war effort that depended so heavily on a stable South Vietnamese 
government. These accusations do not stand up under examination. 
While it is true that the press criticized Diem during this period, so, 
too, did many American diplomatic and military officials in Saigon and 
Washington. Indeed, prior to May 1963 the press consistently reported 
the official U. S. line that, while Diem was not perfect, he held the key to 
success. As the New York Times put it in 1962: 
Official Americans here, though often impatient with some of Ngo's re-
pressive policies and his apparent reluctance to effect reforms, appear to have 
concluded that his leadership. . is an irreplaceable asset. Some Westerners 
who have made a specialty of studying the Vietnamese mind have suggested 
that a mandarin is really what most of the people want. 
The administration felt Diem could be "educated" about democratic re-
forms and government efficiency. Most press coverage of Diem prior to 
May 1963, a combination of support spiked with critical nudges towards 
reform, reflected this view. Some members of the administration and 
many military personnel in Vietnam felt winning with Diem in charge 
was unlikely. But as long as this view remained deviant, it rarely surfaced 
in the media. In some cases reporters censored such criticism, seeing it as 
harmful to U.S. efforts (and their own careers). And when they focused 
on deep-seated problems in the South Vietnamese government and mili-
tary, as Charles Mohr did in 1962 and early 1963 for Time, stories were 
edited back home to fall into line with government policy. 
Negative press coverage increased during the Buddhist crisis, but it did 
so because of a growing debate over the direction of U.S. policy and not 
because journalists launched an anti-Diem campaign of their own. The 
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crisis, coupled with Diem's continued unwillingness to take U. S. advice 
slowly turned the tables within the administration. At first this meant 
that the usefulness of Diem as the means to achieve victory over the com-
munists was open to legitimate debate. By Diem's ouster in November, 
opposition to Diem had become the new consensus. 
The media were important arenas in which the debate played itself out. 
Journalists who had already concluded that the Diem regime was unsal-
vageable were the first to give voice to the now legitimated criticism, but 
the words were those of military advisors and administration officials. 
Here the media did play an important role in the shift in U.S. policy, but 
not as the leader. (Indeed, when the first Buddhist monk hurned himself to 
death in protest, the story did not make the front page of the New York 
Times, and Malcolm Browne's now famous picture of the self-immola-
tion was not run.) Journalists did what they always do, they reported 
what "officials here believe." But now what officials believed was in con-
flict, and the press was an important weapon in the battle for a new con-
sensus. It was, however, a weapon as likely to be used by the pro-Diem 
forces as the anti-Diem ones. In the midst of the crises, for example, 
Time, owned by the virulently anticommunist Henry Luce, published an 
editorial blasting the Saigon press corps for its anti-Diem reporting. And 
even as the administration position shifted away from Diem, Time's edi-
torial staff insisted on so sanitizing Vietnam coverage that Charles Mohr 
and Mert Perry, the magazine's Saigon correspondents, resigned in Sep-
tember 1963. 
The Kennedy administration sought to win the hearts and minds of the 
press corps and so the American public. Kennedy wanted minimal but 
positive coverage of Vietnam and the public airing of internal disputes 
and a stagnating war effort posed a problem. In October of 1963 Ken-
nedy appealed to Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, publisher of the New York 
Times J to recall David Halberstam from Saigon. Sulzberger refused. But 
administration attempts to keep the press in line did not stop here. The 
White House and the Pentagon encouraged Washington-based reporters 
to take brief trips to Saigon, since in a short stay they could not make 
unofficial or dissident contacts and so would be dependent on the official 
government line. Reporters were also subtly pressured by the White 
House staff, who sought to discredit the Saigon press corp by impugning 
their knowledge and analysis of the war. The pressure from the Pentagon 
was less subtle, challenging "not just the reporters' accuracy, but their 
manhood and their patriotism. "8 
The tactics worked. U.S. based journalists, fresh from guided tours of 
Saigon and primed by White House and Pentagon propaganda attacked 
the Saigon press corps. Joseph Alsop called their reporting a "reportorial 
crusade against government," while Marguerite Higgins asserted that 
"reporters here would like to see us lose the war to prove they're right."9 
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Despite such claims, actual press reporting from Saigon was anything 
but unpatriotic. To the contrary, it helped to clearly demarcate the bound-
aries of consensus, debate, and deviance in a way that never challenged 
the status quo. At issue, for the press as for the administration, was how 
best to stop the communists; no journalist ever questioned that they had 
to be stopped. At the height of the crisis Halberstam wrote in the New 
York Times: 
The conflict between the South Vietnamese Government and Buddhist priests is 
sorely troubling American officials here. It has brought to the surface American 
frustrations of the apparently limited influence of the United States here de-
spite its heavy investment in troops, economic aid and prestige to help South 
Vietnam block Communism. 
The theme of television network news coverage also was that Diem was 
hurting the war effort. In August 1963, Chet Huntley, quoting official 
sources, told the ABC audience that "Diem washed eighteen months of 
effort down the drain." In October he reported that "we journalists have 
found the Diem regime guilty of serving Communism." And when 
Diem was assassinated Huntley spoke for all the network anchors when 
he said, "we can now get on with the war." 
Uneasy Consensus: Coveriflg Vietnam between 1964 and 1968 Despite a 
few tense periods, Kennedy and his advisors were successful in guiding 
coverage of the war. Conditions were optimal for this kind of news man-
agement. The cold war had been kept on ice by the Bay of Pigs and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. The images of Khrushchev banging his shoe at the 
U.N. and threatening to "bury" the U.S. built a wall around the sphere 
of consensus as impenetrable as that separating East and West Berlin. In 
addition, although the U. S. was more involved in the war than the Ken-
nedy administration ever admitted, the American presence was still 
limited. 
President Johnson also wanted Vietnam downplayed; the only war he 
wanted to be remembered for was the one against poverty. However, the 
political turmoil following Diem's assassination (a constant fact of life 
from that point on), coupled with the inability of the South Vietnamese 
army to conduct the war as envisioned by the U.S., led to an escalation 
of U.S. involvement. Between the end of 1963 and July of 1964, the 
number of advisors was increased from 17,000 to 75,000, and Americans 
began bombing North Vietnam, first as "retaliation for North Viet-
namese aggression," and ultimately, in February of 1965, as a sustained 
activity. Finally, in July of 1965, at the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, President Johnson dispatched 100,000 combat troops to South 
Vietnam. Vietnam was now an American war. 
Increased U. S. involvenlent altered the relationship between the presi-
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dent and the press, as well as the environment in which that relationship 
played itself out. On the one hand, greater U.S. commitment meant that 
Johnson had to insure public and congressional support for the war. On 
the other, he did not want the war to dominate the public agenda. This 
was still a limited war and one that, like Korea, would not hold the pub-
li<;'s loyalty if closely and constantly scrutinized. Besides, centcr stage be-
longed to the Great Society; Vietnam was an unwanted sideshow. Like 
JPK, LBJ walked a tightrope strung between keeping the war off the pub-
lic agenda and managing media coverage so that public opinion would be 
supportive of the increasing U. S. involvctuent. As the scope of that in-
volvement increased, however, LBJ had to build public support, and this 
required greater media coverage. It was a high wire act Johnson was un-
able to complete. 
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was President Johnson's key to unlocking 
public and congressional support for greater u.s. involvement in Viet-
nam, and the key to the resolution was'LBJ's brilliant manipulation of the 
press. It is, perhaps, the best example of how presidential news manage-
ment can shape public policy. In early August 1964, North Vietnamese 
PT boats and a u.s. destroyer did battle in the Gulf of Tonkin. In re-
sponse, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, giving the presi-
dent the power to take" all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks 
against forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." 
This vague mandate, passed unanimously in the House and with only 
two dissents in the Senate, gave Presidents Johnson and Nixon the power 
to wage an undeclared war in Vietnam, although as recently as June 1964, 
deliberations on a similar resolution had been deferred in Congress be-
cause of a lack of agreement on how to exert increasing pressure on 
North Vietnam. Why the turnabout? 
Clearly the "rallying around the flag" induced by the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident was critical-and depended on the press. The rules of "objective 
journalism" allowed the president to manage the media presentation as 
effectively as if he had written the copy himself. The media's exclusive 
use of official U. S. sources, their focus on the president, the absence of 
interpretation, and the concentration on immediate events at the expense 
of historical context guaranteed that their portrayal of the incident was 
consistent with the administration's evolving policy of escalation in the 
guise of business as usual. Thus the Washington Post reported: 
The United States turned loose its military might on North Vietnam last night 
to prevent the Communist leaders in Hanoi and Peking from making the mis-
taken decision that they could attack American ships with impunity. But the 
initial United States decision was for limited action, a sort oftit-for-tat retalia-
tion, and not a decision to escalate the war in Southeast Asia ... The great 
mystery here was whether the attacks by North Vietnamese PT boats on the 
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American vessels were part of some larger scheme on the Communist side to 
escalate the war. 
The network anchors, in tone and word, also supported Johnson's ac-
tions. We were committed, according to Cronkite, "to stop COlnmunist 
aggression wherever it raises its head ... 
What is remarkable about coverage of the Tonkin incidents is that vir-
tually every report was misleading or even false. For example, contrary 
to the New York Times report that the U.S. destroyer "was on a routine 
patrol when an unprovoked attack took place" and that "there was no 
ready explanation why the PT boats would in effect attack the powerful 
Seventh Fleet," the destroyer Maddox was on an intelligence gathering 
operation near an area where the U.S. had twice attacked North Vietnam 
the day before. In fact, evidence suggests that the second attack by North 
Vietnamese PT boats never happened. Real or not, when heavily re-
ported in the media, it became the public rationale for retaliation and in-
creased U. S. involvement in Vietnam-a policy change decided upon 
before the Gulf of Tonkin incident. 
Increased U. S. military presence in Vietnam led to parallel increases in 
television's coverage of the war. Daniel Hallin notes five "unspoken prop-
ositions" underlying television reporting in this period. First, television 
in general and anchors in particular, referred to Vietnam as our war, por-
traying it as a national endeavor. Second, coverage often placed the Viet-
nam conflict in an American war tradition, in the context of World War 
II, and even of the u.s. frontier. For example, one 1966 NBC report 
closed by signing off from "the First Infantry Division, the Big Red 1 of 
North Africa, Omaha Beach, Normandy, Germany, and now the Cam-
bodia border." Reporters also used the soldier's phrase "Indian country" 
to describe Vietcong-controlled territory. Subtly the historical context of 
Vietnam changes from its own history of occupation and religious and 
civil strife to America's "wild west" and the tradition of "great wars." 
A third theme noted by Hallin is that Vietnam was a testing ground for 
manhood, as defined by John Wayne and Audie Murphy. Vietnam was 
about heroes, toughness, and professionalism: 
Thcy are the greatest soldiers in the world. In fact, they arc the grcatest men in 
the world. (NBC, February 1966) 
They are Marines. They are good and they know it. But every battle, every 
landing, is a new test of what a man and a unit can do. (NBC, Sept 1965) 
But they were bloody, and that's what they wanted. (NBC, July 1966) 
Fourth, television coverage reduced the war to a game, to winning and 
losing. It was the language of sports and technology that, as Hallin says, 
purged the war of moral and political implications, as with "American 
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and Australian forces had somewhat better hunting today," or "American 
soldiers captured the biggest prize so far." The enemy is reduced to de-
humanized targets, to body counts, or to what Chet Huntley called "the 
total score. " 
Finally, television gave the war an appearance of order and progress 
where often there was none. The anchors played an important role in this 
, structuring process, mainly through the "battlefield roundups" that in-
troduced the ftlm footage each night. For example, CBS viewers might 
see Walter Cronkite, often posed in front of a map of Southeast Asia with 
the words RED CHINA arching over the top, declare: 
Today, after meeting three days of desperate, almost suicidal resistance by the 
Vietcong, our troops find the enemy gone into sul1en hiding, our fIrepower 
too powerful to face. For in the three weeks of. . , operation ATTLEBORO, 
the infantry has killed more than four hundred, captured scores, overrun 
strong point after strong point. fu the fIghting rages once again to preserve 
demoCTacy, the GIs themselves have an eye on the elections back home. (No-
vember 1966) 
This image of progress, of an enemy on the run, was based on daily 
press briefIngs by the military in Saigon. Film footage was also govern-
ment influenced, as TV crews "were shunted by helicopter from One 
operation to another by military press officers who wanted to show off 
American initiative." 10 Coupled with reports from Washington and the 
media's inclination to close ranks around the administration in a time of 
war, coverage produced an image of military success. As Hallin notes, "It 
must have been very hard ... for the average television viewer to imag-
ine the possibility that American arms nlight not ultimately be successful 
in Vietnam." II 
Television's emphasis on combat was ironic, since it is less mobile than 
the print media and so more dependent on news from Saigon and Wash-
ington. At times action footage was staged, since the enemy often proved 
too elusive. "The strangest thing about the war was we never saw the 
enemy, the Vietcong ... they vanished whenever we arrived." t2 Once 
U. S. combat troops were committed in large numbers, the story quickly 
became "American boys in action," and this required having cameras in 
the freld (nine network employees were killed in Indochina and many 
more were wounded). But being in the freld did not mean being in battle-
only 22 percent of the pre-Tet film reports from Southeast Asia showed 
combat, and most of these were limited to "a few incoming mortar 
rounds or a crackle of sniper fire." 13 When battle scenes were available, 
they were edited according to explicit guidelines barring the use of graphic 
film of wounded American soldiers or suffering civilians. According to 
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former CBS News president Fred W. Friendly, these network pohcies 
"helped shield the audience from the true horror of the war. " 14 
But while the public received positive reports about the war, a conflict 
brewed within the press corps. To a small but growing number of jour-
nalists, government and media accounts did not jibe with their own expe-
riences in Vietnam. This view cut against the grain of the still-prevailing 
cold ;var consensus, however, and so was met by subtle and not so subtle 
censorship by editors and producers. In part, this internal censorship re-
sulted from editors' suspicions of young reporters who were too com-
mitted to a cause to he objective. More disturbingly, it also reflected di-
rect political intervention. For example, President Johnson intervened to 
stop a 1965 Time article by Frank McColloch revealing that U.S. troops 
were preparing to assume an active combat role. Such presidential in-
volvement in press censorship was not unusual, especially at Time, where 
"any time McColloch had a particularly big story that went against the 
official line, somehow the Administration shot it down through the 
Washington bureau." 15 
Despite the stifling of occasional voices of dissent, a subtle change in 
coverage occurred in this period. In the print media, doubts were raised 
in the editorial page or buried deep in the inverted pyramid of a news 
story. The New York Times, for example, ran editorials urging stronger 
efforts at diplomacy, or, towards the end of news articles, referred to un-
named sources who questioned the stability of the South Vietnamese 
government or the competency of their military. Occasionally a soldier's 
quote would reveal a growing sense of confusion and frustration. But the 
administration was never criticized directly, and the format of newspaper 
reporting assured that readers could distinguish "fact" from opinion and 
the "important facts" from less important ones. 
In television, less information is conveyed, and the distinction between 
fact and interpretation is blurred. Television thus limited itself to simpler 
and fewer themes, presenting issues in black-and-white terms. Most 
often this meant our good guys heroicaUy but inexorably succeeding 
against the bad guys. But sometimes the norms of reporting forced the 
networks to make choices and present information they would just as 
soon not. The most dramatic example of this prior to Tet was in August 
1965, when Morley Safer's crew filmed U.S. marines destroying the vil-
lage of Cam Ne. Safer's report threw CBS into turmoil. While no one 
wanted to air footage of American boys indiscriminantly burning down 
houses, they had the film and the norms of journalism clearly said show 
it. The night it aired, CBS was swamped by phone calls from viewers 
who were outraged that CBS would" do something like this, portraying 
our boys as killers, American boys didn't do things like that. Many of the 
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calls were obscene." \(, The next day, CBS executive Frank Stanton was 
awakened by yet another phone call: 
"Frank," said the early-morning wake-up call, "Are you trying to fuck me?" 
"Who is this?" said the still sleepy Stanton. "Frank, this is your President, and 
yesterday your boys shat on the American flag." 17 
, The administration's reaction did not end here. Johnson, convinced Safer 
was a communist, did a thorough search of his past. (Upon finding that 
Safer was clean, but Canadian, Johnson replied, "Well I knew he wasn't 
an American. ") 18 Johnson also ran a check on the marine officer who took 
Safer to Cam Nc, and a Pentagon offIcial tried to get the Vietnamese 
cameraman for CBS fired, "complaining that one of the keys to this evil 
story was that CBS had used a South Vietnamese cameraman, a sure sign 
of alien influence. " 19 
The norms of newsworthiness were instrumental in a second challenge 
to the administration's policy in Vietnam during this period-the 
Fulbright hearings. William Fulbright was the senator who had, based on 
Johnson's promise that no U. S. ground troops would be committed to 
Vietnam, shepherded the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. 
By early 1966 he felt betrayed and helpless, as the administration's line on 
Vietnam received exclusive media coverage. Thus, in late January 1966 
Fulbright used committee hearings on a supplemental foreign aid bill as a 
platform to lambast the administration. When representatives of the ad-
ministration appeared before the committee, he made Vietnam the issue. 
The confrontations were highly newsworthy, given the legitimate nature 
of the opposition (a respected senator), the stature of the forum (the 
Capitol building), and the confrontational nature of the issue (Congress 
vs. the president; a heated challenge to the president's Vietnam policy by 
a member of his Own party and a former supporter). In fact, NBC and 
CBS covered much of the hearings live, despite the high cost in lost reve-
nues. (Fred Friendly, eventually prevented from continuing coverage due 
to the cost, resigned as president ofCES news.) The Fulbright hearings, 
however, and the Cam Ne incident arc most notable as exceptions during 
this period. Shifting the norm required changing the definitions of con-
sensus, legitimate controversy, and deviance. This shift occurred in dra-
matic fashion in January of 1968. 
Expanding the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy: The Tet Offensive Cov-
erage of the Tet offensive is among the most controve-rsial-a-~pccts of the 
war. While military historians agree the offensive failed, it launched 
large-scale opposition to the war at home. The tenor of press coverage 
did change during the offensive. Prior to Tet journalists editorialized in 
about 6 percent of the television stories on Vietnam. During the two 
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months of the offensive, tills percentage jumped to 20 percent, subse-
quently dropping to about 10 percent. 20 Newspapers also editorialized 
more during Tet, often on the front page. 
The administration's view of the offensive was not ignored-papers 
and networks dutifully reported the official line, often as the lead of the 
story. On February 2, for example, the Washington Post's headline read: 
"LBJ CALLS UPRISING FAILURE-VIETCONG HOLDING ON IN HUE; THIEU ASKS 
MORE'BOMBING-PRESIDENT SEES REPULSE OF NEW DRIVE." Now, however, 
"upbeat" messages were presented in ways that led one to doubt their 
accuracy. For example, the New York Times reported on February 2 that 
the "latest propaganda line [is] that we arc now seeing the enemy's 'last 
gasp'." Government optimism was being reported in a way that turned it 
on its head. The press remained dependent on government sources, but 
no longer fully believed them. The result was a style of reporting that 
presents "facts" in a way that says these are not facts. 
Television, with its tendency to blur fact and opinion, portrayed Tet 
even more bleakly. Again, reporters did not suggest Tet was a military 
defeat. Cronkite's statement of February 14, 1968-"First and simplest, 
the Vietcong suffered a military defeat" -was typical. Instead, the lnes-
sage was that such victories did not add up to winning the war. For ex-
ample, CBS offered this description of prisoners captured by the U. S.: 
These pathetic-looking people may be Buddhists rather than Vietcong, and 
there's little record of the Buddhist's and the Vietcong working very closely 
together. About the only thing certain is the government hasn't won any 
friends here today. If the purpose of this war is to win the hearts and minds of 
the people, the capture of An Quang pagoda can be considered a defeat. (Feb-
ruary 2, 1968) 
An NBC report on February 20 paints a similar picture of futility: 
American Marines are so bogged down in Hue that nobody will even predict 
when the battle will end ... More than 500 Marines have been wounded and 
100 killed since the fighting in Hue began. . The price has been high and it's 
gained the marines about 50 yards a day or less in a heavily populated part of 
the citadel. Still, nothing is really secure ... Most of the city is now in rubble 
. and many Vietnamese say the fight isn't really worth it now that their city 
is dead. 
And from the siege ofKhe Sanh CBS reported: 
So there is no end in sight. The North Vietnamese out there beyond the fog 
show no inclination to pull back or attack. U.S. commanders show no inclina-
tion just yet to drive them back. So for the Marines and the Seabees and the rest 
here, there is nothing to do but sit and take it, just to wait, and hope they'll 
rotate out, leave before they join the roster of the wounded and dead here. 
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As a picture of military reality such reports may have been too pessi-
mistic. By this time, however, reporting of individual events had become 
a metaphor for the war as a whole. An AP wire quoting a U. S. major in 
Ben TIc perhaps best captures the thenlC of the war coverage during this 
period: "It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it." 
This theme was reinforced by the frequency of vivid scenes of casualties 
and urban destruction. Such scenes were four times morc frequent dur-
ing the Tet period than during the rest of the war, and scenes of military 
casualties were almost three times more cmurnon,21 
Three events are particularly emblematic of the Tet coverage. The £lrst, 
from early in the offensive, was the photo and film footage of Colonel 
Loan blowing the brains out of a captured Vietcong on a Saigon street. 
Putting aside the debate over whether the act was justifIable, the impact 
of this film on the estimated twenty million Americans who saw it was 
devastating. Nothing had prepared them for such a horrible, naked 
image of the war, and especially not for such an image of "our side's" 
behavior. 
The second media event was Walter Cronkite's hour-long special on 
the Tet offensive, broadcast on February 27. Cronkite, a supporter of the 
war prior to Tet and perhaps the most trusted lnau in America presented 
a shocking picture of the immediate situation and of the overall war 
effort. He concluded: 
It seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is 
to end in a stalemate. This summer's almost certain standoff will either end in 
real give-and-take negotiations or terrible escalation; and for every means we 
have to escalate, the enemy can match us. . And with each escalation, the 
world comes closer to the brink of cosmic disaster. To say that we arc closer to 
victory today is to believe, il~ the face of the evidence, the optimists who have 
been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to 
unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only 
realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusiOl"l. 
These sentiments were echoed by other journalists and anchors, but as 
Johnson himself was purported to say, "Cronkite was it. "22 
Finally, on March 31, one day before American troops broke the s~ige 
ofKhe Sanh and effectively ended this two-month offensive, LBJ told the 
American public on national television that 
With America's SOl~s in the fIelds far away, with America's future under chal-
lenge right here at home, with our hopes al~d the world's hopes for peace in 
the balance every day, I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of 
my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awe-
some duties of this office-the Presidency of your country. Accordingly, I 
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shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another 
term as your president. 
This speech marked more than the end of the Johnson presidency; it 
marked the beginning of the end of the war. When LBJ changed the 
opening of his address from "I want to talk to you about the war in Viet-
nam," to "I want to talk to you about peace in Vietnam," 23 the idea of a 
military victory was gone forever. And the media, true to its tendencies, 
took the president's lead. As ABC telexed its Saigon personnel: "We are 
on our way out of Vietnam." 
Never was the phrase "to win the battle but lose the war" more appro-
priate than with Tet. Johnson later reflected that "while the Viet Cong and 
North Vietnamese may have failed militarily with Tct, they did achieve 
the psychological victory they sought."" During this two-month "de-
feat" for the North, public opinion in the U. S. shifted dramatically. Be-
tween November 1967 and February 1968 those believing the U. S. was 
making progress in the war dropped from 51 percent to 32 percent. By 
late March LBJ's approval rating was 26 percent, a 13-point drop since 
November." And, as the siege ofKhc Sanh ended on April 1, for the first 
time a majority of Americans opposed the war. 2(, Policy followed opinion 
as plans for an increase in u.s. force levels were put indefinitely on the 
back burner. Administration talk shifted from "the war effort" to "the 
peace effort." Johnson ordered another halt to the bombing of North 
Vietnam. 
In explaining this turnaround in public opinion and public policy, 
many point an accusing finger at the press. Former reporters like Peter 
Braestrup contend that "the collective emanations of the major media 
[produced] a kind of continuous black fog of their own, a vague conven-
tional 'disaster' image."27 ABC anchor HowardK. Smith charged that 
the networks "just showed pictures day after day of Americans getting 
the hell kicked out of them. That was enough to break America apart."" 
President Johnson, in a speech to the National Association of Broad-
casters on April 1, 1968, even suggested that the presence of television 
might have altered the outcome of World War II or Korea. '" Why did cov-
erage change during this period? Was the media responsible for the shift 
in opinion and policy, and for our eventual withdrawal from the war? 
Answers to these questions are more complex than many critics pre-
tend. This shift in media coverage did not occur out of the blue. Recall 
that since the early sixties a minority of Saigon correspondents, govern-
ment officials, mi1itary personnel, and citizen dissidents had questioned 
the strategy andlor legitimacy of the war. When Tet shook the establish-
ment perspective on the war, causing a momentary void, these critics 
stepped in to fill it. For example, during the Tet offensive Neil Sheehan 
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published a story (cowritten by Hedrick Smith) revealing General West-
moreland's request for more troops and the "stirring debate" it caused in 
the administration. The story would not have been in the works had 
Sheehan not been haunted by the war since 1962; but without Tet it 
would never have been published in a form capable of, according to Walt 
Rostow, "churn[ing] up the whole eastern establishment. "30 Tet, in short, 
gave those who had long questioned the war access to the agenda and 
control of the peg on which news is hung. Had there not been such 
people waiting in the wings, the Tet offensive might have produced 
much less journalistic chaos and might have been lncre easily pigeon-
holed as a military victory story. 
Much of the pressure for expanding the sphere of legitimate debate 
came from within the administration, where civilian advisors challenged 
the military's optimistic assessments and requests for more troops. In 
Congress, too, concerns were building. And the media voices that both 
reflected and fueled this growing debate were not deviants; they were 
well-known supporters of the war, like Cronkite, Reynolds, and even 
Howard K. Smith. 
Signs of this growing debate existed prior to Tet. Beginning in the 
spring of 1967 with the battle for Hills 861 and 881, and continuing into 
the fall with the battles of Con Thien and Oak To, the North's tactics 
shifted to more concentrated battles, raising the level of concern within 
the U.S. media, public, and government. Media reports, while still over-
whelmingly supportive, began to show the doubts that would dominate 
the Tet period: 
One high-ranking official ... said he thought the enemy was willing to take a 
million casualties, which at the current ratio would mean 200,000 U.S. casu-
alties, with at least 25,000 killed, and that figure may be conservative. "Will 
the American people accept those losses?" I wondered. "Do they have any 
choice?" was his rejoinder. "Then the real war out here is just beginning?" I 
asked. The official nodded his head in assent. (CBS, April 12, 1967) 
The battle for Dak To has now become the bloodiest of the war for American 
and North Vietnamese troops ... The question every GI asks and cannot an-
swer is, "Was it all worth it?" No one rcally knows. (CBS, November 22, 1967) 
McNamara's resignation soon after a public clash with the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff added fuel to this smoldering flte. 
This increasingly public display of doubt affected public opinion. While 
most indicators of support for the War remained strong, the percentage 
of Americans who felt getting involved in Vietnam had been a mistake 
and who disapproved of Johnson's handling of the war began to grow in 
1966. 31 In short, the erosion of support for the war was accelerated, but 
not created, by Tet. 
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Ironically, much of the negative coverage during Tet can be laid at the 
feet of the Johnson administration itself. In part it was the inescapable 
price of previous media management. The success of efforts to make the 
war appear both minor and successful now came back to haunt the Pen-
tagon and the White House with a vengeance. Film footage and stories 
during Tet were dramatic in their own right. Counter posed to years of 
exagg~rated claims of U. S. and South Vietnamese control and deflated 
estimates of North Vietnamese and Vietcong strength, they were dev-
astating. The American public and media were caught unaware. The 
Johnson administration failed to deal forcefully and directly with this dis-
may. Had Johnson taken control of the agenda during Tet, the void that 
was filled by critical, pessimistic reports might never have been opened. 32 
Indeed, support for LBJ and the war increased at the beginning of the Tet 
offensive, providing the platform upon which he could have reestab-
lished his leadership. Instead he retreated into brooding silence while his 
support plummeted, to rise again only when he announced his with-
drawal from politics. 
Finally, the nature of the Tet offensive and of the routines of news 
gathering added to the dramatic nature of the coverage. Prior to Tet most 
combat occurred outside the cities and therefore away from where most 
journalists and camera crews were stationed. Where before they de-
pended on the military for access, during Tet "merely by stepping out-
side their hotels, correspondents found themselves willy-nilly in the 
midst of bloody fighting. There was no way that the attacks in broad 
daylight on such landmarks as the presidential palace could be concealed 
from television cameras.")3 Moreover, the frantic pace of events during 
Tet sped up the normal routines of filming, transporting, editing, and 
broadcasting. Unedited films were flown immediately to Tokyo, broad-
cast via satellite to New York (a rare and expensive procedure), and put 
straight on the air. The result was not the orderly, bloodless images to 
which audiences were accustomed, but raw visions of chaos, destruction, 
and Americans on the defensive. 
It is the airing of these films that best reflects the complex interaction 
of journalistic norms as to what is newsworthy, the chaos ofTet, the me-
dia's distrust of the administration in this period, and the void left by the 
administration's failure to reestablish its authority. The war had come to 
the journalists, and in ways that did not fit the well established mold. 
Government reports were assumed to be false and were automatically 
questioned. As if to make up for their sins of omission and naivete, jour-
nalists gave the horror of the war free reign. Had the offensive not pro-
vided so many visually arresting imag~s it might not have had the -same 
effeCt. - I-I:Id the military not so exaggerated American superiority and 
Vietcong-inferiority, or had the press not accepted its claims so fully, the 
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effects of the Tet offensive might have been different. But in combina-
tion, these factors loosened the grip of editors, producers, generals, and 
the administration on the media and offered critics of the war an opening. 
Even the North Vietnam_esc were able to occasionally get their perspec-
tive onto American front pages and into the evening news. 
In the end, however, the media never questioned American motives or 
the policymaking system itself. They merely questioned the soundness of 
the tactics and whether the benefits of this protracted, bloody war out-
weighed the rising costs. These were precisely the questions being raised 
by congrcsspersons, senators, administration officials, and soldiers in the 
field. The ll"ledia were no more responsible for the shift in public opinion 
and policy against the war effort during the two months of Tet than they 
were for maintaining that support and policy during the prior seven 
years-and no less responsible either. 
A New ConsCflsus? Media Coverage after Tet After Tet, coverage of the 
war settled into a new normalcy. The networks returned to the standard 
operating procedure of shipping flim by air freight. This delay-fllm 
would arrive in New York as much as five days after the shots had been 
taken-meant a return to timeless pieces designed to be non-specific. 
NBC, for example, ordered correspondents to "be careful about filming 
events that might date thetllselves. "34 The end of a crisis attllosphcre also 
meant a return to sanitized inlages, and "the military scene was depicted 
as a series of orderly American actions against an unseen foe. "]5 
This new consensus differed from the one preceding Tet, however. 
The media now portrayed the war as a stalemate. In late 1968, for ex-
ample, NBC rejected producing a series showing that Tet had been a 
military victory because, in the words of an NBC executive, Tet was "es-
tablished in the public's mind as a defeat, and therefore it was an Ameri-
can defeat. "3(. This new view of the war is dramatically reflected in statis-
tics on the media's description of battles as victories or defeats. Prior to 
Tet, of those battles journalists characterized, 62 percent were described 
as U. S. victories, while only 28 percent were described as defeats and 
2 percent as stalemates. After Tet, the number of victories reported fell to 
44 percent, the number of defeats rose slightly to 32 percent, and the 
number of stalemates jumped to 24 percent. 37 
Even during this last phase of the war, the media was still loyal, but Tct 
had changed the tenor of the coverage. Anchors and corre~pondents no 
longer portrayed the war as a national endeavor and seldom referred to 
"our war." They no longer invoked the memory of World War II, in 
effect disconnecting Vietnam from American tradition. Gone too was the 
macho sports image of the pre-Tet stories. "Today in Saigon," reported 
NBC inJune 1969, 
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they announced the casuality figures for the week, and though they came out 
in the form of numbers, each one of them was a man, most of them quite 
young, each with hopes he will never realize, each with family and friends 
who will never see him again. Anyway here arc the numbers. 
The most dramatic example of this shift to the personalization of the 
deaths of U.S. teenagers was the June 27,1969 edition of LIFE. It simply 
presented the faces and names of the 242 U.S. soldiers killed during a 
"typical" week in Vietnam. The effect was devastating: 
The story was so plainly done, there was the air of a high-school yearbook to 
it; one did not know these kids, but one did-they were kids who went to 
high school and who, upon graduation, went to work rather than college. Nor 
were these photos by Karsh of Ottawa. Their very cheapness and primitive 
quality added to the effect, the pride and fear and innocence in the faces, many 
of them being photographed in uniform, half scared and half full of bravado. 
It was almost unbearable. It was an issue to make men and women cry.J8 
Gone was the sense of purpose, of order. Consider the following: 
The Special Forces and the enemy fought this battle to a standstilL And there 
was nothing left but to tend the wounded, and fight again another day. (CBS, 
Oct 1, 1968) 
Finally, the themes of military victory, of "halting communist aggres-
sion" and "preserving democracy" simply disappeared. Instead, the pol-
icy statements read in the papers and heard on TV (made mostly by ad-
ministration and congressional spokespersons) focused on how to end 
the war, on its costs to the U.S., and on how to protect U.S. troops and 
bring home prisoners of war. 
The Nixon administration introduced a dual strategy of "Vietnamiza-
lion," or returning the war to the South Vietnamese, and "peace with 
honor," or negotiating an American withdrawal without losing face. 
This strategy had' contradictory clements, however. Vietnamization 
meant the removal of U.S. combat troops, but getting the North Viet-
namese to negotiate required added military pressure; this, in turn, posed 
serious media and public relations problems. 
The result was a schizophrenic relationship between the media and the 
Nixon administration. On issues where there was mainstream consen-
sus-that we should withdraw, that we must negotiate for peace rather 
than win it militarily, that the South Vietnamese should fight their own 
war, that the North Vietnamese were still the enemy-the administration 
could count on the press's support. The media focused on relatively posi-
tive portrayals of the South Vietnamese army, and on the Paris peace 
talks. By 1970, consistent with U.S. policy, the main story on all three 
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networks had become the withdrawal of American troops. When negotia-
tions failed to produce results, the media blamed the North Vietnamese: 
President Nixon's new peace plan for Vietnam was formally offered at the 
Paris peace talks today, and the Communists reacted with sneers, wisecracks, 
and sarcasm. But actually that's about what was expected of them. . In this 
country the president's plan has won wide support and approval in both par-
ties (NBC, October 8, 1970) 
Conversely, the president and the press collided when his policies most 
openly contradicted the mainstream consensus, and especially when they 
led to the war's expansion. When-as at Hamburger Hill in May 1969, 
the invasion of Cambodia in April 1970, and the invasion of La os in Feb-
ruary 1971-the war seemed to be escalating and U.S. casualties rose, the 
media, opposition leaders, and even the troops themselves, turned against 
the administration: 
The elite Special Forces have fought well and bravely as usual but for a mili-
tary objective of doubtful value ... After you've been here a while and seen 
all the casualties you come away with the distinct impression that the 
principle reason these Special Forces have been ordered to take Million Dollar 
Mountain is simply because its there. (CBS, March 21, 1969) 
U.s. casualties could no longer be portrayed in a positive, meaningful 
light. This shift away from military objectives made combat especially 
tough on the soldiers, whose nl0rale dropped precipitously. This was not 
missed by the press, which reported on poor morale with increasing fre-
quency. In one ABC report in April 1972, for example, footage of "an 
officer persuading reluctant troops to go out on a mission by assuring 
them it was not an offensive operation" concluded with the report saying 
"one thing does seem for sure: the average American soldier no longer 
wants any part of this war-even in a defensive posture." 39 
The Nixon administration also suffered in the press when its policies 
appeared inconsistent or deceptive. In September 1970, when the admin-
istration halted and then resumed bombing the North, the networks 
(echoing sentiment in parts of the government and the public) suggested 
that it was internally torn and lacked a clear policy. Revelations of the 
secrct bombing of Cambodia in May 1969 further heightened tensions 
between the press, the administration, and the loyal opposition, as did 
the controversy over the printing of the Pentagon Papers in 1971. 
The most important story of the post-Tet period, however, was the 
My Lai massacre of as many as 500 civilians. Coverage of this incident is 
revealing for a number of reasons. First, the failure of the press to report 
the massacre for an entire year after the event reflects the dependence of 
the media on military reports. On the day of the massacre (March 17, 
VIETNAM AND THE PRESS 149 
1968) AP, UPI, and the New York Times ran stories presenting the action 
at My Lai as a normal-search-and-destroy action. MACV reports, which 
made no mention of civilian deaths, were used almost verbatim, spiced 
up by details that gave a morc personal (though fictional) touch." Sec-
ond, that the press did evcntually report the massacre shows how the war 
had shifted from a consensus to a legitimately controversial issue. In the 
past s~milar atrocities were usually ignored, and made it to the main-
stream media only in unusual circumstances such as the Safer film from 
Cam Ne. 
Third, despite the unprecedented coverage My Lai received, the media 
never challenged the morality of the war effort more generally. In addi-
tion, the media's focus on the trial of Lieutenant Calley, rather than on 
the massacre itself, pegged it as a story of individual misdeed, declining 
morale, and American justice rather than military atrocity:1I 
The anchors also separated My Lai from any systematic pattern or pol-
icy: "My Lai was for Americans an exceptional horror. My Lais for the 
other side are a daily way of life." (Howard K. Smith, ABC, May 28, 
1970) Such commentary was typical of coverage throughout the war: 
U.S. atrocities were aberrations, the acts of individuals momentarily out 
of control; North Vietnamese and Vietcong atrocities were com_mon-
place, the willful acts of irrational murderers or the application of a sys-
tematic policy of terror. 
The War at I-Iome: Maintaining the Boundary Between Debate and Devi-
ance Common wisdom suggests that the national media gave the anti-
war movement unfettered access to the public, thus helping to turn pub-
lic opinion and policy against the war and, ultimately, to bring down the 
Johnson and Nixon presidencies. A closer examination suggests that, 
while the media did cover the movement and domestic opposition to the 
war was influential, the media was as responsible for tnaintaining support 
for the war as for its deterioration. Moreover, during the period of de-
clining support for the war, the media was critical in keeping antiwar, 
and later anti-Nixon, protest from becoming the basis for a more sys-
tematic critique of the political, social, and economic system. 42 
Like the war itself, the antiwar movement went through several phases 
of coverage. From 1960 to 1964, when groups like the SDS began orga-
nizing on college campuses, the mainstream media largely ignored the 
movement. By the end of 1965, however, SDS had grown to 124 chap-
ters and 4,300 members. That year, with the spontaneous eruption of the 
Free Speech Movement at Berkeley and the March 17 march on Washing-
ton, organized by the SDS to protest growing U.S. involvement in Viet-
nam, the student movement became newsworthy. Reporters sought out 
protests and articles appeared that spring in many national magazines (for 
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example, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News, Saturday Evenilt,'? Post, the New 
York Times Magazine, the Nation, and the New Republic). 
But greater attention from the mainstream press meant attention from 
inside the cold war consensus looking out. The movement was often 
trivialized (making light of student members' clothes, language, goals), 
marginalized (made to appear deviant, unrepresentative), and presented 
as deeply divided internally. [n addition, stories almost always counter-
posed the movement with ultra right groups, as if to say that extremism is 
extremism_. At the same time, the movement was presented as ineffective 
and so not a worthwhile political alternative. 
With the Fulbright hearings in early 1966, domestic unrest became a 
standard news peg upon which to hang a story. From_ this point on, al-
most one in five broadcasts about Vietnam dealt with this issue. But ex-
cept for infrequent criticism from "responsible" representatives such as 
senators and congress persons, coverage remained largely negative. And 
as the number and size of protests grew (ironically, partly in response to 
the media's coverage of earlier protests) television began to paint the pro-
testors with more sinister strokes: 
While Americans fIght and die in Vietnam, there are those in this country who 
sympathize with the Vietcong. (ABC, October, 1965) 
Meanwhile, Hanoi was having paroxysms of joy over the demonstrations in 
this country. (NBC, October, 1965) 
In a 1965 CBS broadcast on the day before nationwide demonstra-
tions, Morley Safer showed a group of GIs in Vietnam a fthn of an anti-
war draft-resistance lecture. He then asked one of the soldiers, "You're 
getting shot at. Five of your buddies were killed down the road the other 
day. How did you feci watching the mm?" One soldier, filled with emo-
tion, responded he wished it had been the people in the film, and not his 
buddies, who had been killed. The media also regularly portrayed the 
antiwar movement as violent. While stories occasionally addressed police 
brutality and overreaction, more often the theme was antiwar provo-
cation: "The sight of the [NLF] flag was too much for some of the 
onlookers ... the angry crowd along the roadway jumped in to do away 
with the Vietcong symbol" (CBS, 1967). The antiwar movement both 
attracted and repelled the media. Protests and demonstrations, especially 
when visually dramatic or confrontational, were perfect for television 
news. In addition, sonle of what the protestors said hit a responsive 
chord with sonle reporters. But the protests clearly fell outside the sphere 
of legitimate controversy, and so were presented in an almost exclusively 
negative light. 
With Tet and LBJ's decision to not run for reelection, coverage of the 
antiwar movement changed. In part there was a shift in the boundary de-
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termining what was acceptablc-a widening of the political arena. In 
part, however, this shift also marked the appearance a modified version 
of the antiwar movement-a mainstream, middle-class version. Sena-
tors, congresspersons, and much of Middle America said enough is 
enough, and the media repeated their statements. The electoral process, 
perhaps the best barometer of what is and is not acceptable, raised the 
issue of the war. When Eugene McCarthy nearly beat Ed Muskie in the 
1968 New Hampshire primary, the antiwar movement had crossed into 
the realm of legitimate controversy. 
Throughout this period the media played a key role in defining the new 
boundaries and identifying who was to be allowed in and who remained 
outcast. As Time editorialized in 1968, 
in an era when many young Americans are turning away from involvement in 
the democratic process by dropping out either to psychedclia or to the ni-
hilism of the New Left, the cool, crisply-executed crusade of Eugene McCar-
thy's 'ballot children' provides heartening evidence that the generation gap is 
bridgeable-politically at least. 
This role of border guard was most evident in the coverage of the Mora-
torium demonstrations of October 1969. That a mass demonstration 
could be considered legitimate shows how far the boundaries had shifted 
since Tet. However, for Middle America and its media, there are good 
and bad demonstrations. With its connections to the political establish-
ment (McCarthy, Kennedy, McGovern) and its middle-class support, the 
Moratorium was a "good" demonstration and was presented as such. 
Observed CBS, for example, "Today's protest was different.. peace-
ful, within the law, and not confined to a radical minority" (October, 
1969). Compare this to CBS's coverage of the more spontaneous, stu-
dent-led protests that followed the U. S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970: 
"The Cambodia development set off a new round of antiwar demonstra-
tions on U.S. campuses, and not all of them were peaceful." Again and 
again the post-Tet theme was the distinction between legitimate and il-
legitimate protest. Consider tllls statement, made about a student effort 
to lobby Congress: "earnest, clean-shaven college students, full of facts, 
not rhetoric, carrying well-written resolutions and legal briefs in their 
hands. . These emissaries are just about as weary of high-flown oratory 
as their ciders" (CBS, May, 1970). 
As opposition to the war was first legitimated and then became the 
consensus, the Inedia had to redefine and guard the nation's boundary on 
the right as well. The violence of pro-war protesters, hard hats, the po-
lice, the National Guard, and even the Nixon administration was increas-
ingly denounced in much the same fashion as the radical Left. Indeed, 
what is most distinctive of this period is that for perhaps the only time in 
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our history an adm.inistration occasionally found itself outside the sphere 
of legit it nate controversy. The result was the ultimate demise of that ad-
ministration. nut here, again, the media was as important in preventing 
this chaotic situation from evolving into a larger questioning of the sys-
tem as it was for branding Nixon as a deviant. Ultitnately it was not the 
press that brought Nixon down. Rather it was his inability to distin-
guish, as the media had, between the loyal opposition and the protesters 
who had more fundamental grievances but posed a serious threat to the 
administration only in the minds of Nixon and his cadre of advisors. 
The Legacies of Press Coverage of the Vietnam Era 
Media coverage of the war in Vietnam has left a number of specific legacies 
affecting the press, government, grass-roots groups, and the general 
public. The prcss, ironically, is the least changed by the events of the 
1960s. True, there is now an institutionalized adversarial relationship 
with the White House that is much more likely to be set in motion than 
before the Vietnam era. The press has also added a few more specific 
news pegs to its standard operating procedures. It is ilnpossible to speak 
about the use of U.S. troops overseas, about protests and demonstra-
tions, about political scandals, and so forth, without referring, explicitly 
or iUlplicitly, to the Vietnam experience and its immediate aftermath. 
(Consider, for example, the common use of the phrase "another Viet-
nam," or the addition of the suffix -gate, as in "Koreagate" or "Contra-
gate".) The press, in certain circumstances, is also lnore likely to present 
official information to the public with a L'uge and cynical grain of salt. 
Yet for all this, the press remains largely dependent on the govermnent 
for its information about the political world. It remains an institution 
whose modus operandi is reporting what official sources say. And so, it 
remains the central institution for maintaining the boundaries of consen-
sus, lcgitinute debate, and deviance. If anything, this role has fallen even 
more to the press, as other traditional institutions of sociopolitical he-
gemony have continued to decay and as the media industry has become 
more centralized, nationalized, and tied economically to the status quo 
over the past two decades. 43 
This risk-averse behavior of the press is also the result of the media 
becoming newsworthy in and of itself. Since the Vietnam era and the 
speculation that the press was unduly influential in the outcOlne of the 
war, social unrest in the United States, and the fall of President Nixon, 
the role of the media in covering social and political events has become 
part of the story. This puts the press in an unusual bind. On the one 
hand, bccoming part of the story mcans challenging the myth of objec-
tivity upon which thc press depends for it credibility. On the other hand, 
the press's dependence on reporting what official sources say means that 
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if those sources make the media an issue, it becomes an issue. As a result, 
the media will often back down from an issue rather than run the risk of 
becoming the story themselves. 
The utility of this tendency as a tool in managing the media has not 
been lost on the government generally, nor on the White House in par-
ticular. While they have learned slowly, presidential administrations are 
now fl..Illy cognizant of two criticallcssons of the Vietnam era: the press is 
crucial to the success or failure of an administration; in the relationship 
between the press and the White House, the latter holds almost all the 
cards. Presidential administrations now devote huge amounts of time, re-
sources, and personnel to the management of public image. By limiting 
the amount and kind of information released, by controlling the press's 
access to people and information in government, by expanding the sphere 
of consensus and constraining the sphere of legitimate controversy, by 
exploiting those parts of the press that allow direct access to the public 
(speeches, photo opportunities, and so forth) and limiting those that 
allow the press to more freely control the spin of a story, and by intim-
idating the press through making it part of the story (accusing it of bias 
or sensationalism, threatening it with costly law suits, and so forth), gov-
ernment has clearly gained the upper hand in limiting negative coverage 
and increasing advantageous coverage. 
Foreign policy is in part shaped by the lessons of Vietnam, though thus 
far these lessons appear limited to don't take the press along during mili-
tary interventions (a la Grenada); don't use U.S. troops when engaged in 
limited warfare (d 1a Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan); and, as much 
as possible, use covert rather than overt operations (a la the Iran-Contra 
affair) . 
Domestic policy has also been affected by the Vietnam era. The recent 
dismantling of many of the social welfare and civil rights programs of the 
1960s and early 1970s was possible only because of the ability of the 
Reagan and Bush administrations to paint those programs as failed poli-
cies of a misguided liberalism. Such a representation of the Vietnam era is 
only possible by successfully manipulating the media environment in 
which our collective memory is preserved. The Reagan and Bush admin-
istrations have proven masters of such manipulation, knowing when and 
how to go public with certain issues (for example, tax reform, the Gre-
nada invasion, the flag-burning controversy) and when to back off and 
try more covert strategies (for example, the weakening of many environ-
mental and social regulations, the secret war against Nicaragua, arms 
sales to Iran). Perhaps most impressively, even when certain policies back-
fired (as with the bombing of the U. S. embassy in Lebanon, the attempt 
to roll back certain social security benefits, the incredible growth in the 
budget and trade deficits, and the Iran-Contra affair), the Reagan admin-
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istration was able to cut off public scrutiny before much long-term dam-
age to the administration's credibility was done. Compare the way these 
events played themselves out in the press with similar public issues of the 
1960s and early 1970s, and it becomes clear that the lessons of the Viet-
nam era have thus far worked to the advantage of government. 44 
The organized public on both the left and the right have become more 
sophisticated in either avoiding the mainstream press through the use of 
direct-mail and grass-roots organizing, or in presenting themselves in 
ways designed to capture the attention of media. Like the government, 
they have learned that they can be active agents in how they are presented 
in the press. However, they lack the resources of government and most 
lack the credibility as well, making their task a much more difficult one. 
And, of course, how and if a group is presented still very much depends 
on where it is located in the spheres of consensus, debate, and deviance. 
The more removed frOlTI the mainstream a group is, the less likely it is to 
get its message heard, and the more sensational must be its actions in 
order to get attention. This in turn increases the likelihood that the group 
will be presented as illegitimate and that its agenda will be misrepre-
sented or simplified. 
And what of the larger public, for whom politics is a less central con-
cern? Coverage of consensus and deviance, because such stories are pre-
sented fr01n a point of view (the fonner is good, the latter bad), remain 
successful at maintaining the status quo in older generations and repro-
ducing it in younger ones. Coverage oflcgitimate controversy, however, 
especially when it deals with problems that are both serious and seem-
ingly intractable, lacks such a context. Presented with either disembodied 
facts or point-counter-points in which the logic, implications, or veracity 
of each side is left unexplored and assumed to be equally plausible, citi-
zens are only able to use such information if they have their own well-
developed political perspective from which to interpret the news. Such 
citizens are rare in our society, however, and (ironically) the way in which 
we expect most citizens to develop such a perspective is by being active 
consumers of the news. 
Viewed in this way, one legacy of the Vietnam era may be an anesthe-
tizing, alienating overload. Almost twenty-five years of uncritical images 
of business as usual, interspersed with tales of incompetence, corruption, 
violence, and destruction, have taken their toll. For the current genera-
tion of young adults, adolescents, and children such stories are the norm, 
not the exception. It is not that the stories are false. But presented as they 
are-as objectified, disembodied facts devoid of context-they can only 
frustrate. 
In the end, however, the real legacy of Vietnam is less what has changed 
than what has been revealed. The role of the press in the United States is 
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influenced by two different ethics-the libertarianism of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, with its emphasis on a free, diverse, adversarial 
press, and the social responsibility of the twentieth century, with its focus 
on balance and objectivity. The legacy of press coverage of the war sug-
gests that what passes for objectivity is in fact hegemony. And, despite 
the cries of bias, what passes for advocacy is little more than a stcno-
grap~ic. relativist presentation of disputes among the powers that be. Ul-
timately the question raised by press coverage of Vietnam is the impact of 
this style of informing the public on both the form and the substance of 
political discourse in the United States. 
NOTES 
1. In this essay the terms press and news media will be used interchangeably and 
refer to both electronic and print media. This essay is limited to a discussion of 
the mainstream media, and docs not explore the very different dynamic that ap-
plies to the alternative press. 
2. For a detailed discussion of the experience of soldiers in Vietnam, see D. 
Michael Shafer, "The Vietnam Combat Experience: The Human Legacy," in this 
volume. 
3. The following discussion draws upon Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is 
Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), and Daniel C. Hallin, 
The Uncensored War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
4. Hallin, The Uncensored War, p. 117. 
5. Ibid., p. 127. 
6. The following section draws upon Peter Braestrup, The Bi,i! Story (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); Edward Jay Epstein, Between Fact and Fiction 
(New York: Vintage, 1975); David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York: 
Dell, 1979); Hallin, The Uncensored War, and upon my own examination of news 
footage and newspaper and magazine accounts. Unless otherwise noted, direct 
references to particular broadcasts, and newspaper or magazine stories are from 
these sources. 
7. Cited in Epstein, Be/ween Fact aHd Fiction, p. 215. 
8. Halberstam, The Powers That Be, p. 627. 
9. Cited in Hallin, The Uncensored War, p. 34. 
10. NBC correspondent Ron Nesson, as cited in Epstein, Between Fact and Fic-
tion, p. 217. 
11. Hallin, The Ul1cer/soml War, p. 146. 
12. NBC correspondent Lem Tucker, as cited in Epstein, Between Fact and Fic-
tiOll, p. 217. 
13. Hallin, The Uncensored War, p. 129. 
14. Cited in Epstein, Between Fact and Fiction, p. 217. 
15. Halberstam, The Powers That Be, p. 664. 
16. Ibid., p. 683. 
156 MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI 
17. Ibid., p. 683. 
18. Ibid., p. 683. 
19. Ibid., p. 681. 
20. Hallin, The Uncensored War, p. 169. 
21. Ibid., p. 171. 
22. Austin Ranney, Channels oj Power (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p.6. 
23. Herbert Y. Schand1cr, The Unmaking oj a President (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1977), p. 273. 
24. Kathleen]. Turner, Lyndol'l Johnson's Dual War (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), p. 232. 
25. Roper polls reported in Bracstrup, Big Story, and Hallin, The UnccHSored 
War. 
26. Epstein, Between Fact and Piction, p. 224. 
27. Bracstrup, Big Story, p. 706. 
28. Epstein, Betweell Fact and Fiction J p. 223. 
29. Michael Mandelbaum, "Vietnam: The Television War," Daedalus 111 
(Fall, 1982), p. 157. 
30. Cited in Hallin, The Uncmsored War, p. 169. 
31. John E. Mueller, Presidents and Public Opinioll (New York: Wiley, 1973). 
32. Turner, Lyndon johnson's Dual War. 
33. Epstein, Betweell Fact and Ficfioll, p. 220. 
34. Ibid., p. 225. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ha1lin, The Uncellsored War, pp. 146, 166. 
38. Halberstam, The Powers That Be, pp. 676-77. 
39. Hallin, The Uncensored War, p. 180. 
40. Braestrup, Big Story, pp. 249-53. 
41. Hallin, The UI/censored War, p. 180. 
42. This section draws on Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, and Hallin, The 
UlueI'lsored War. For a further discussion of the war at home, see "Vietnam, Ide-
ology, and Domestic Politics," in this volume. 
43. For a discussion of the increasing centralization of the media as an industry 
in the United States, see Ben Bagdikian, The Media Nloflopoly (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1987). 
44. For a discussion of the Reagan administratiOl~'s dominance of the press, see 
Mark Hertsgaard, 011 Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (New 
York: Farrar Strans Giroux, 1988). 
